Can Bohmian Mechanics Be Made Background Independent? by Vassallo, Antonio
Can Bohmian Mechanics Be Made
Background Independent?
Antonio Vassallo
University of Lausanne, Department of Philosophy, CH-1015
Lausanne
antonio.vassallo@unil.ch
Forthcoming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics.
Abstract
The paper presents an inquiry into the question regarding the compat-
ibility of Bohmian mechanics, intended as a non-local theory of moving
point-like particles, with background independence. This issue is worth
being investigated because, if the Bohmian framework has to be of some
help in developing new physics, it has to be compatible with the most well-
established traits of modern physics, background independence being one of
such traits. The paper highlights the fact that the notion of background inde-
pendence in the context of spacetime physics is slippery and interpretation-
laden. It is then suggested that the best-matching framework developed by
Julian Barbour might provide a robust enough meaning of background in-
dependence. The structure of Bohmian dynamics is evaluated against this
framework, reaching some intermediate results that speak in favor of the
fact that Bohmian mechanics can be made background independent.
Keywords: Bohmian mechanics; background independence; shape space;
best-matching.
Notation: In the following, all equations will be written in natural units such
that c = G = ~ = 1. The symbols Eins, Riem, Weyl, R will designate, respec-
tively, the Einstein, Riemann, and Weyl tensors, and the curvature scalar.
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1 Introduction
It is widespread opinion among physicists and philosophers that modern physics
rests on two robust theoretical pillars, namely, quantum theory and general rela-
tivity. The motivation for this opinion has several deeply intertwined aspects such
as strong empirical corroboration, eectiveness in treating a wide range of con-
crete cases, and mathematical beauty. From a scientific realist perspective, the
current situation might be summarized as follows: although neither quantum the-
ory nor general relativity are “final theories”, still they succeed in grasping some
of the most fundamental facts regarding the physical world. It is then obvious
that whatever further theoretical development - be it the quest for a final theory
that unifies all the aspects of reality or, (not much) more modestly, the eort to
construct a theory that provides a quantum description of gravitational phenom-
ena - is very likely to preserve the main constitutive features of quantum theory
and general relativity. The problem, however, is to clearly spell out what such
constitutive features are and what physical significance they bear: this is where
the widespread consensus breaks down and makes way for a lively debate on the
interpretation of the afore-mentioned theories.
For example, one of the most debated interpretational problems - perhaps the inter-
pretational problem par excellence in modern physics - is the measurement prob-
lem in quantum physics. Schlosshauer (2007) eectively summarizes the core
of the issue in the following question: «Why do measurements have outcomes
at all, and what selects a particular outcome among the dierent possibilities de-
scribed by the quantum probability distribution?» (ibid., p. 50).1 Such a question
naturally arises once it is claimed that the complete physical description of any
quantum system (including measuring apparatuses) is encoded in a wave function
	 (evolving in time according to the Schrödinger equation), and becomes all the
more compelling when this claim is taken to entail that all there is to the world is
just wave functions.
Many solutions to the measurement problem have been proposed over the years,
some of them involving a mere reinterpretation of the standard formalism - per-
haps on the ground of a brand new logic -, some others providing further theoreti-
cal structure. This paper will be concerned with one among these latter proposals,
namely, the de Broglie-Bohm theory in the form set out in Dürr et al. (2013),
commonly referred to as Bohmian mechanics (BM). To cut the story short, BM
succeeds in solving the measurement problem (at least, in the non-relativistic case)
1To be fair, Schlosshauer claims that this is just an aspect - that he dubs “the problem of
outcomes” - of the overall issue, which includes “the problem of preferred basis” and “the problem
of the nonobservability of interference”. However, the above characterization of the problem is
sucient for our purposes. The interested reader can also refer to Maudlin (1995a) for an extensive
philosophical discussion of the measurement problem.
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by (i) postulating an ontology of material point-particles with definite positions in
Euclidean 3-space at all times, and (ii) providing a deterministic law of motion
depending on 	 for the temporal development of the universal configuration of
such particles. In Bohmian terms, the measurement process is just a complicated
“dance” involving the particles constituting the measured system and those mak-
ing up the measuring apparatus. A measuring outcome - for example, a pointer
pointing on a display, or a spot on a photographic plate - is thus just a certain
configuration of particles as observed at a given time. In BM, there is no real
indeterminism regarding the possible outcome of a measurement. By taking into
account - besides 	 - also the initial positions of the particles, the law of motion
singles out the final configuration of the system plus measuring apparatus, and
hence a definite outcome.2
We will be more precise about the formal machinery of BM in the next section.
For the time being, we just note that BM is also able to account for one of the
most puzzling fundamental facts about reality that the quantum theory captures,
that is, quantum non-locality. By this designation it is usually intended the empir-
ically proven fact3 that the statistical distributions of outcomes of measurements
performed on - to fix the ideas - two ensembles of quantum systems E(A) and E(B)
prepared such that A and B are in an entangled state, are correlated no matter how
far in space A and B are placed, such statistical correlation being not explainable
in terms of a past common cause.
The fact that BM tells a coherent story about quantum measurement processes -
including the explanation of the non-local character of some of them - makes it
a serious contender for providing a robust interpretational framework for future
developments in quantum theory. However, if BM has to prove as a really useful
approach in developing new physics, it cannot ignore the second pillar of modern
physics, namely, general relativity. In such a context, what a Bohmian approach
should provide in order to be taken seriously by the scientific community is a way
out from the apparent incompatibilities between quantum theory and relativity.
Just to have a hint of one of such incompatibilities, consider the embedding of
non-locality in a relativistic spacetime, say the Minkowski one of special relativ-
ity. In this context, the above sketch of non-local correlations can be translated
by saying that an event E(A), such as the appearance of an outcome for a mea-
surement performed on A, can be influenced by other events happening outside
the past lightcone of E(A). Such a conceptual tension between non-locality and
the lightcone structure of relativistic spacetimes is inescapable for whatever theory
that seeks to account for quantum phenomena, hence also for BM. The question of
2For a detailed defense of the claim that BM solves the measurement problem, see Maudlin
(1995b).
3See, for example, Aspect et al. (1981, 1982).
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the compatibility between BM and relativity has been tackled in several papers;4
however, we have the impression that just one particular aspect of the problem has
been extensively discussed so far.
To better frame our complaint, we need to agree on what the main tenets of (gen-
eral) relativistic physics are, and this is surely a controversial matter. Anyway,
we think that the most part of physicists and philosophers would agree at least
on two points. First of all, in relativistic physics the only salient spatiotempo-
ral structure is that encoded in a 4-dimensional semi-Riemannian metric tensor.
Here, with “salient” we mean that the most necessary physical information about
a spatiotemporal setting is specified once and for all once a metric is given. This
is, of course, not to say that the specification of a metric automatically exhausts
the physical description of a spacetime (e.g. a metric alone does not fix a unique
connection, so that we have to specify some extra condition, such as compatibility,
in order to associate a single connection to a metric), but it is just to claim that,
in a relativistic context, no geometrical object is needed over and above a single
4- dimensional semi-Riemannian metric in order to describe the metrical proper-
ties of spacetime.5 The second key requirement is the absence of spatiotemporal
structures that act as backgrounds (we will call this feature background indepen-
dence). One of the most important lessons from general relativity, in fact, is that
spacetime is not an inert arena in which physical interactions between material
objects take place, but it is by itself a dynamical entity that interacts with matter.
Both issues are overwhelmingly important in the general quest for the unification
of the “relativistic” with the “quantum”. As already mentioned, the spatiotem-
poral structure needed to accommodate quantum non-locality is very unlikely to
be encoded just in a relativistic 4-metric - into which the lightcone structure in
fact inheres -, and background independence is also incompatible with quantum
theory, because this latter theory is formulated over an inert “container”, be it a
Newtonian or Minkowski spacetime.
Returning to the special case of BM, in our opinion, what it is that has been dis-
cussed so far is the compatibility of BM with the former relativistic tenet, that
is, that all of the structure inhering within spacetime is encoded in the 4-metric,
but not much has been said on the latter, namely, whether the formulation of BM
can dispense with spatiotemporal backgrounds. Under the light of the above men-
tioned incompatibility within quantum theory and general relativity, this question
is extremely interesting because, if it turned out that the structure of the dynamics
in BM cannot be made compatible with a background independent context, then
we would have a strong argument against viewing the Bohmian approach as a use-
ful framework in the development of new physics that overcomes the dichotomy
4See, for example, Dürr et al. (2014).
5This is what Maudlin (1996, p. 292) calls Relativistic Constraint.
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between the “quantum” and the “relativistic”.
The paper will start by giving a general overview of BM, will continue by dis-
cussing how to sharpen the above presented notion of background independence
in spacetime physics, and will end by considering the possibility of extending BM
to a background independent context under the light of the analysis carried out.
2 The Bohmian Approach to Quantum Physics
The roots of BM go back to the work of Louis de Broglie (1928, 1960), later
revived by David Bohm (1952a,b). Here we will discuss the version of the theory
put forward, for example, in Dürr et al. (1992, especially section 3).
The core dynamical feature of BM is adding a further equation parallel to the
Schrödinger evolution for the wave function:
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Formally, (1b) depicts a vector field on R3N depending on 	, whose integral
curves Q = Q(t) can be intended as collections of N continuous trajectories
fqi = qi(t)gi=1;:::;N stretching in a spacetime with topology R3  R. The dynamics
encoded in (1) is deterministic: once provided a set of initial conditions (	0;Q0)
at a fixed time t0, the dynamics singles out a unique dynamical evolution at earlier
and later times. Moreover, it can be shown that (1) recovers the Born’s rule of
standard quantum mechanics, thus matching all the empirical predictions of this
6Note that equations (1) can be made compatible with whatever Riemannian structure definable
on configuration space (Dürr et al., 2006, section 2). The relevance of this fact will become
apparent in section 4.
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latter theory.7
The physical interpretation of BM is straightforward: the theory talks about N
massive spinless8 point-like particles with definite positions qk = (xk; yk; zk) in
Euclidean 3-space at all times; the wave function in this picture has the role of
generating the vector field on the right-hand side of (1b), and it is thus said to
“guide” the motion of the particles. The peculiar feature of BM, what makes it
a quantum theory as opposed to a classical one is evident in (2), the motion of a
particle being instantaneously dependent on that of all the other N   1 particles.
This is how BM implements non-locality: by virtue of (1b) being a non-local law.
Furthermore, BM is a universal theory in primis since (1) describes the dynam-
ics of all there is in the universe - i.e. particles. However, the theory provides
a consistent procedure for defining sub-configurations of particles approximately
behaving as isolated quantum systems guided by an “eective” sub-wave function.
It is exactly thanks to this fact that BM accounts for ordinary quantum measure-
ments.9
BM breaks with standard quantum mechanics in a striking way: the former the-
ory admits a clear ontology - particles with definite positions in 3-space at each
time - and dispenses with the reality of quantum superpositions in that, at each
time, there is just a well-defined configuration Q of concrete objects localized in
3-dimensional Euclidean space. Such an ontology of classical objects accounts
for non-locality through the entanglement relation among particles encoded in the
wave function. Here we do not want to dig too deep into the metaphysical char-
acterization of 	 in BM, suces it to say that the theory does not require to look
at the universal wave function as some sort of physical field, but rather accords
to it a nomological role.10 Instead, the important point to be highlighted is that,
among the ontic commitments of the theory, there is not only that to particles, but
also that to a Euclidean 3-space and an objective universal time: these two latter
elements enter (1) exactly in the same way as they enter in classical mechanics,
namely, they are just an arena where particles move. In a word, BM as sketched
here is a background dependent theory in a very clear and intuitive sense. Is there
any possibility to modify (1) in order to render the theory background indepen-
dent? Before attempting to answer this question, we need to clarify the possible
meaning of background independence. In the next section, we will see why find-
ing a definition of background independence, even guided by the clear Newtonian
intuition of what a background is, is anything but a simple task.
7See, for example, Dürr et al. (1992) for a detailed technical justification of this claim.
8However, the theory can be easily generalized in order to account for phenomena involving
spin, as shown, for example, in Norsen (2014).
9See, again, Dürr et al. (1992, section 5).
10An extensive metaphysical discussion on this subject is carried out, e.g., in Esfeld et al. (2014).
6
3 Background Independence: A Slippery Concept
The intuitive notion of background independence is, indeed, very simple: a theory
is background independent if it is the case that the “container-contained” metaphor
does not apply to it or, less metaphorically, if it is the case that all the “actors” en-
tering the physical description are subjected in one way or another to physical in-
teraction. However, when coming to a concrete characterization of background in-
dependence, this heuristic picture reveals itself to be rather feeble. This is mainly
because there are many factors that enter the physical description provided by a
theory, and it is not always simple to discriminate among them real “actors” from
mere formal features.
Despite the conceptual diculties that we are going to spell out in a moment, the
requirement of background independence is of paramount importance in modern
physics, and represents a constraint on any future theoretical development. There
are many arguments - philosophical and physical - in favor of this view; here
we limit to state the two most obvious among them. The first argument has a
metaphysical flavor, and goes like this: a physical theory describes the physical
interactions between physical entities, and the very notion of interaction requires
some kind of reciprocal “influence” between the physical actors; it is thus suspi-
cious to admit in the physical picture some entities - in fact, background structures
- that influence others without being aected in return, since that would seem to
imply the existence of strange one-way interactions. Absolute space and time in
Newtonian mechanics are a perfect example of suspicious background structures:
their existence and characterization is independent of the material content of the
universe, yet they influence - indeed, they define - the motion of material bodies.
The second argument is more physical and refers to the second pillar mentioned in
the first section, namely, general relativity. In this theory, the description of grav-
itational phenomena is indistinguishable from the characterization of spatiotem-
poral structures (e.g. tidal forces as geodesic deviation), and hence the dynamics
of gravitational interactions presupposes a dynamical nature of spatiotemporal
structures. In short, in general relativity space and time are not backgrounds in a
Newtonian sense, since they are influenced by the material content of the universe.
Therefore, any modern theory that seeks to incorporate gravitational phenomena,
or that just claims to be compatible with their description, needs at least to be
compatible with background independence.
Having clarified the motivation for looking at background independence as a very
important component entering modern physical theories, let us continue by laying
down a semi-formal sketch that can help us to carry out an analysis of background
independence. Just to keep things simple, we agree to model spacetime as a 4-
dimensional dierentiable manifold M over which several geometric objects can
be defined either as mappings from M to another space X (e.g. if X is a vector
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space, then some properly defined map  : M ! X would be a vector field over
M) or, viceversa, as mappings from X to M (e.g. if X = R, then a continuous and
dierentiable mapping  : R! M would represent a parametrized curve () on
M). This way of formulating a theory is usually called intrinsic because it does
not rely on the notion of coordinate system in order to be laid down. Of course,
all the above framework can be translated in a coordinate dependent language,
where the geometrical objects are given in terms of components (e.g., matrix ele-
ments) in a given coordinate system. Usually, the geometric objects defined over
M pertain to two distinct categories, namely, (i) those taken to encode the physical
geometric structure of M (such as metric tensor fields, connections, curvature ten-
sors, and the like), and (ii) those taken to represent material stu displaced over
spacetime. In a so construed theoretical framework, the “physical happenings”
are described by a set of equations E relating the geometric objects defined over
M. A solution of E is called a model M of the theory, from which physically
observable quantities are supposed to be extracted for purposes of empirical test-
ing. Such observable quantities depend on the physical degrees of freedom of the
theory, which are represented by those geometric objects in E which are actually
subjected to dynamical evolution. This latter point introduces a vital distinction
for assessing the background independence of a theory, that is, the distinction be-
tween dynamical and absolute objects. In short, to say that an object is absolute
is to say that it appears unchanged modulo dieomorphisms (that is, bicontinuous
and dierentiable mappings from M into itself11) in all the models of the theory.
A theory is then background independent if it does not admit absolute objects.12
Such a definition seems to nicely fit into the intuitive characterization provided
at the beginning of this section. According to this criterion, Newtonian mechan-
ics easily qualifies as background dependent, since all its models always admit
the same geometrical structures, which characterize a Newtonian spacetime (e.g.
distinguished spatial and temporal metrics). On the other hand, general relativ-
ity qualifies as a background independent theory: this is because a generic model
of the theory has the form M =< M; g;T >, the metric tensor field g and the
stress-energy tensor T being both dynamical objects related by the Einstein’s field
equations E  Eins[g] = 8T. This means that, in general, taken two models of
E, M1 =< M; g1;T1 > and M2 =< M; g2;T2 >, it will be the case that g1 , g2
and T1 , T2. At this point, it seems that we have given a well-defined formal
criterion for assessing the background independence (or lack thereof) of a theory:
we just scan the solutions space of E in search of “persistent” structures, and if we
find them we flag them as absolute objects, thus judging the theory as background
11In general, a dieomorphism can relate dierent dierentiable manifolds. Here, the word
“dieomorphism” will designate just those from M to itself.
12This characterization was firstly developed by Anderson (1967) and further refined by Fried-
man (1983).
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dependent; otherwise we conclude that the theory is background independent. Un-
fortunately, such formal criterion works just in extremely simple and clear cases.
An evident flaw in the above criterion is given by the fact that, according to it,
even allegedly background independent theories might turn out to contain abso-
lute objects. For example, in a general relativistic theory describing an universe
filled with “dust”, i.e. a perfect fluid with positive mass density and identically
null pressure, the velocity vector field of this dust will be the same up to dieo-
morphisms in all models of the theory, thus qualifying as an absolute object.13
This example points out that the condition of being dynamical is not always suf-
ficient to exclude absoluteness, and this is due to the fact that we can always
render absolute objects dynamical by adding further conditions to E. Just to have
a rough idea of why this is so, imagine we have a simple theory including a flat
background spacetime represented by a Minkowski metric ; in order to render
such a theory background independent in the above sense, we just need to refor-
mulate it in terms of a generic tensor field g that satisfies the dynamical condition
Riem[g] = 0, that is, which has no Riemannian curvature, i.e. it is flat. Obviously,
in this very simple example, all solutions of the theory would feature a g which is
just a dieomorphic image of , thus making very easy to individuate the back-
ground in disguise; however, the more complicated the theory, the less obvious is
spotting possible absolute objects rendered dynamical in this way.14 The reason
why individuating background structures uncontroversially is not always simple
is that, in general, deciding whether a structure is absolute or not is a matter of
interpretation. Let us focus on this latter point by considering a theory describing
the non-linear propagation of a scalar field  over Minkowski spacetime. In this
case, E can be written:
Riem[g] = 0; (3a)
g =  43T; (3b)
which seems to clearly represent a background dependent theory, g being the
background Minkowski metric “camouflaged” as a dynamical object. However,
let us now consider a generic conformally flat metric g0, such that:
g0 = 2g; (4a)
 = ( detjg0j) 18 ; (4b)
g = g0( detjg0j) 14 ; (4c)
13See Pitts (2006) for a detailed discussion of this and similar cases.
14See Giulini (2007) for a self-contained yet extremely illuminating discussion of this type of
issues in spacetime physics.
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where detjg0j can be seen as the determinant of a matrix representing the tensor g0
in a given coordinate system. If we rewrite equations (3) using the metric g0 so
defined, we obtain:
Weyl[g0] = 0; (5a)
R[g0] = 24T: (5b)
Now, the theory (5) qualifies as background independent: for any two models
M1 =< M; g01;T1 > and M2 =< M; g
0
2;T2 >, in general g
0
1 , g
0
2 and T1 , T2.
It seems then, that we have reached a paradoxical situation: (3) and (5) given (4)
are equivalent, but while the former theory is background dependent, the latter is
background independent. The way out of this unwanted situation is to recognize
that the physical significance of (4) rests on the interpretation chosen. If we inter-
pret the theory as describing a field propagating over Minkowski spacetime, then
(4) is just a way to compactly write the couple (g; ) using a geometric portman-
teau g0 which, however, is not to be intended as a “real” metric tensor field. If,
on the other hand, we take the theory as describing a conformally flat dynamical
metric tensor field, then (4) is a way to reformulate the framework on a flat fixed
space by using a “fake” scalar field .
At the moment, there are on the table dierent proposals for making sense of the
notion of background independence even in these complicated cases. A remark-
able analysis is developed by Belot (2011)15 in the context of field theories: the
core of Belot’s proposal is to think of background independence not as a all-or-
nothing aair - as the above discussion centered on the notion of absolute object
might suggest, but rather as a feature that comes in degrees. Also in this frame-
work, background independence has not the status of a formal definition, but de-
pends on the interpretation given to a theory.
There are two major morals to be drawn from the above quick overview that are
useful for us. Firstly, spotting background structures in a theory is an interpretation-
laden task. Secondly, claiming that a theory is background independent because
all the spatiotemporal structures figuring in it are dynamical is not sucient. The
immediate consequence of these two facts is that there is no “formal test” that
judges if a theory is hopelessly background dependent or might be rendered back-
ground independent in a non-trivial physical sense with some modifications in
its formalism. This conclusion is all the more important in our case, since we
are trying to assess the compatibility between background independence and the
Bohmian dynamics encoded in (1).
15From which the above example is taken.
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4 Background Independent Bohmian Dynamics
The discussion carried out in the previous section helps us evaluating the solidity
of the conceptual ground on which we are to base our discussion on the com-
patibility between background independence and Bohmian dynamics. As it will
become clear in a moment, this ground is fortunately firm enough to let us derive
some intermediate results that can be spent in a research eort towards the imple-
mentation of a background independent Bohmian framework.
First of all, let us make extremely clear what kind of theory we are discussing
here: the subject of our inquiry is just the theory (1), that is, a non-local theory
of moving point-like particles simpliciter. It is important to point out this fact be-
cause there are some proposals on the table about a Bohmian theory where what
is guided is the general relativistic gravitational field (one of the most worked
out among them being that proposed by Goldstein and Teufel, 2001, which treats
the components of a Riemannian 3-metric as the “stu” to be guided). These
theories try to implement background independence by construction, in the sense
of spatiotemporal structures being dynamical ab initio. However, in such cases,
considerations about background independence are deeply entangled with further
(huge) conceptual issues rooted in the far more general attempt to quantize grav-
ity. A decent discussion of this topic would be too long and technical, and hence
cannot be put forward in this paper. Saving such concerns for future investiga-
tions, we note en passant that the preliminary results we will state here might be
useful also in the quest for a Bohmian theory of quantum gravity.
So let us focus on (1), and firstly note that the way the equations are written does
not satisfy the characterization of a physical theory adopted in the previous sec-
tion. This is because, formally speaking, the equations are given in a coordinate
dependent language and, furthermore, they are written in a particular coordinate
system. Hence, they should at least be written in a general coordinate system
in order to be translated in the intrinsic language involving geometrical objects
defined over a manifold M. However, it is a simple exercise to show that the prob-
lem is solved by including in the theory some properly defined objects, such as a
(co)vector field t that acts as a “universal time” for a stack of Euclidean 3-spaces
(planes of absolute simultaneity), each with a given 3-metric tensor: in this way,
we can for example substitute the ordinary time derivative with a covariant tem-
poral derivative with components tr in a generic coordinate system fxg. With
these adjustments in place, (1) can be rewritten in a way that satisfies our start-
ing definition, thus allowing us to extend the considerations made in the previous
section to the present case. After this task has been carried out,16 we immediately
16The technical details should not bother us in the present context, see Friedman (1983, chapter
III) for a comprehensive treatment of the intrinsic formulation of classical mechanics.
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notice that the geometric objects introduced to generalize the theory are nothing
but the spatiotemporal structures involved in the intrinsic formulation of classi-
cal mechanics. This comes at no surprise since, by construction, BM involves
the picture of a dynamical evolution that physically unfolds in a neo-Newtonian
or Galilean spacetime.17 This also makes evident a fact that was already clear at
the beginning of the discussion: BM is a background dependent theory in a fairly
clear sense, because the motion of the particles takes place over a Newtonian
spacetime that aects their motion without being aected in return.18 But if we
talk about one-way interactions, there is an even more striking background struc-
ture appearing in BM, namely, the wave function. It is in fact evident from (1) that
	 influences the motion of the particles, but its evolution is not in turn aected
by them. Hence, how can we even just dream to obtain a background indepen-
dent Bohmian dynamics, given that the wave function is an indispensable feature
of standard BM? Replying that, in fact, 	 is subjected itself to dynamical evolu-
tion is clearly not enough: if the above mentioned “action-reaction” requirement
represents an eective rule of thumb to spot background structures in a theory,
then claiming that 	 is a dynamical object because it obeys (1a) has no more
force than claiming that a semi-Riemannian 4-metric satisfying Riem[g] = 0 is
not a background Minkowski metric. Fortunately, this worry can be easily put
aside by noticing that 	 qualifies as a background structure (in the “action-but-
not-reaction” sense) just in case we reify it, i.e. we consider it as a concrete entity
(say, a field in configuration space) that literally pushes the configuration of par-
ticles along a trajectory. However, the power of formulating BM as (1) resides
exactly in providing a straightforward interpretation of 	 not as an object, but as
a law-like element of the formalism. To have a rough idea of why it is so, con-
sider that the role of 	 in the present formulation of BM is to generate through
(1b) a vector field in configuration space whose integral curves are the physically
possible dynamical evolutions of the system under scrutiny. This is analogous to
that what happens in Hamiltonian mechanics: there we have a law-like object, the
Hamiltonian function, which generates through the Hamilton’s equations a vec-
tor field in phase space, whose integral curves are, again, the physically possible
17But not everyone agrees on this: someone claims that the dynamics of BM is better under-
stood as taking place in a full Newtonian spacetime, where there is a notion of absolute rest (see
Valentini, 1997, in this respect). However, this disagreement is tangential to our analysis, since
both neo- and full Newtonian spacetimes admit the same purely spatial symmetries, on which we
will shortly focus. For this reason, from now on, we will obliterate the distinction between these
two spacetimes.
18To be precise, BM is formulated in configuration space and not in spacetime. However, from
what has been presented in section 2, it is straightforward to argue that the theory treats only the
latter as the real physical space (this is not to say, of course, that there is no possibility at all to
argue that the configuration space is in fact the real space; however, this marvellous point will not
be considered here).
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evolutions of a system. With this analogy in mind, we perfectly see why 	 fails
to qualify as a background structure according to the “action-reaction” rule of
thumb: in reality, it does not push the particles in a literal sense, so the question
whether the particles react on it is meaningless, exactly as it is meaningless to ask
whether a mechanical system reacts on the Hamiltonian.19 Having clarified that it
is the Newtonian background that makes BM a background dependent theory in
an interesting sense, we can ask the next question, that is: Can BM be made back-
ground independent in a physically non-trivial sense? The discussion developed
in section 3 seems to lead towards a discouraging answer: of course we can ren-
der dynamical the spatial and temporal metrics of the theory, together with all the
other spatiotemporal structures needed to formulate the dynamics (1), by adding
further dynamical conditions, but the resulting theory could hardly be considered
something more than an elaborate mathematical trickery. However, not all hope
is lost yet: perhaps some alternative strategy can be proposed in order to strip BM
of its Newtonian background in a substantial sense while retaining all the good
physics in it. Fortunately, such a strategy exists and, roughly speaking, consists
in showing that the Newtonian background is not a fundamental structure of the
theory but “emerges” from an underlying framework that dispenses with it. Let us
now turn to the details of such a strategy, originally proposed by Julian Barbour
and his collaborators.20
For the time being, let us put aside BM and consider just a Newtonian theory of
N particles with a well defined total kinetic energy Tclass = 12
PN
i=1 mi
dqi
dt
dqi
dt and
interacting via a classical potential V = V(q1; : : : ;qN) being a pre-assigned func-
tion of the coordinates. Such a theory, like BM, is most perspicuously formulated
in the configuration space R3N; hence these two theories, although being radi-
cally dierent from a dynamical perspective, “share” the same Newtonian back-
ground, namely, a spatiotemporal structure of the form R3  R which, roughly
speaking, amounts to a pile of Euclidean 3-planes of absolute simultaneity glued
together by a rigid time-like flow. According to Barbour, stripping absolute space
and time from this theory amounts to constructing a physically equivalent theory
that treats spatial degrees of freedom as gauge, and (similarly) regards Newtonian
time t as just one among many possible - and physically equivalent - choices of
parametrization for the dynamical evolution of the system.
As regards the elimination of the spatial structure, the preliminary step to be taken
is inquiring into the ways in which this background aects the physical charac-
terization of a configuration of particles. To this extent, consider, just to fix the
ideas, two possible configurations of N = 3 particles Q1 and Q2 characterized
19This point is also discussed in Dürr et al. (1997, section 12).
20See Barbour and Bertotti (1982) for one of the first papers on the subject, and Pooley and
Brown (2002, especially sections 6 and 7) for a philosophical appraisal of Barbour’s strategy.
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by the fact that all the three particles in each of them have the same relative Eu-
clidean distance: in short, the shape of both Q1 and Q2 is that of an equilateral
triangle. Obviously, what distinguishes Q1 from Q2 is the position of the particles
involved with respect to Euclidean 3-space. More precisely, Q1 and Q2 repre-
sent two dierent embeddings of the same shape in Euclidean space. The notion
of sameness involved here is the following: if we take the two configurations,
we hold one fixed and we move the second in 3-space just using transformations
pertaining to the Euclidean symmetry group E(3) - such as rigid translations and
rotations - until it is “juxtaposed” with the starting one, then the two configu-
rations overlap: they are perfectly matched. The fact that the shape of the two
configurations is preserved under dierent embeddings is due to the symmetries
of Euclidean space. Intuitively, since Euclidean space is homogeneous (there is
no distinguished place) and isotropic (there is no distinguished direction), we can
place the triangular configuration under scrutiny wherever and with whatever ori-
entation, without changing its shape. This reasoning can be extended to dilations,
in the sense that we can include in the matching moves also the stretching of the
distances between the particles in the configuration under the condition that the
relative angles are preserved: in this case, we should enlarge the symmetry group
to contain also uniform scalings, thus ending up with the similarity group S im(3)
of Euclidean 3-space. We have now reached a crucial point: if we take as funda-
mental the notion of sameness provided by the matching moves, then we conclude
that dierent embeddings of the same shape are just gauge degrees of freedom,
since applying whatever transformation in S im(3) to a shape does not change it.
In other words, we pass from standard Newtonian mechanics to a new theory that
considers all spatial (or, better, embedding-related) dierences as not fundamen-
tal. This, in turn, hints at the fact that, in this new theory, the spatial background is
not fundamental either. In other words, we are willing to claim that the Newtonian
background is not a core feature of our new theory.
In order to make this claim more precise, let us consider again the configuration
space R3N; according to what we have said so far, this space contains redundan-
cies consisting in all the points corresponding to configurations that have the same
shape. Therefore, it is natural to take the fundamental configuration space of the
theory as the one we get by quotienting out all these redundancies form the pic-
ture. In the present case, such fundamental space of shapes is Q0 = R3N=S im(3).
Under this new picture, the now “emergent” configuration space R3N has a prin-
cipal fiber bundle structure Q0  S im(3), Q0 being the base space and the fibers
S im(3) being the equivalence classes of shapes under Euclidean symmetry group
transformations.
So much for the elimination of spatial degrees of freedom. The next step is to
implement on the new fundamental configuration space Q0 a dynamics that does
not depend on a distinguished “temporal” parameter. This is achieved by setting
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up a geodesic principle on Q0 analogous to Jacobi’s principle in classical me-
chanics.21 The basic idea is to define a modified Jacobi’s principle - let us call it
best-matching principle - that selects kinematically allowed shapes and matches
them in such a way that their sequence represents a geodesic curve of Q0.
In order to specify when two dierent shapes are best matched, we need to define
a “distance” between shapes. To this extent,22 we start by defining the action of
S im(3) on a generic configurationQi asS(!; ) jiQ j, with! a set of auxiliary fields
that parametrizes the symmetries, and  the generators of these symmetries: this
action represents “vertical” shifts along the fibers. Secondly, we need to construct
a covariant derivative D depending on ! and  that measures “horizontal” change
on a trial curve between neighboring fibers. With this machinery in place, it is
possible to define a Jacobi-type action S J depending on the “shifted” particles’
coordinates qi = S(!; ) jiq j as well as on their covariant derivatives, which, after
some mathematical manipulations, takes the form:
S J =
Z
d
pCT ; (6)
where
T = Tclass
 
dt
d
!2
=
1
2
NX
i=1
mi
dqi
d
dqi
d
(7)
is the parametrized kinetic energy written in terms of the shifted coordinates, and
C = E   V . V is the classical potential, while E is a quantity whose physi-
cal meaning will become clear in a moment. It is important to note that (6) is
invariant under reparametrizations, that is, the action does not change whatever
monotonically increasing parameter  2 R we choose; hence, the coordinates qi
are not anymore parametrized by a distinguished time t. The best-matching prin-
ciple is finally implemented by properly extremizing this action with respect to
the auxiliary fields (i.e. by computing the variation S J = 0).
The condition S J = 0, although formally defined over R3N , suces to define the
geodesic principle on Q0 searched for. In fact, it features a flat metric on Q0 pro-
portional to T , which is curved by a conformal factor C (we recall that all these
objects are given in terms of shifted coordinates Sq and covariant derivatives
Dq). Extremizing the action amounts to finding the curves in Q0 that put together
or “stack” the shapes having the minimal best-matched “distance”.23 Note that
21The standard reference for a formal introduction to this important variational principle of
mechanics is Lanczos (1970, chapter V, section 6).
22The technical details of the following procedure can be found, e.g., in Gryb (2011, chapter 2).
23An important physical consequence of implementing the best-matching procedure is the ap-
pearance of constraints on the canonical momenta that amount to the vanishing of the total mo-
mentum, the total angular momentum, and the total “dilational” momentum of the system in the
center-of-mass rest frame. For more technical details, see Barbour (2003, section 4).
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all this procedure does not involve any consideration based on ordinary spatial or
temporal notions.
By varying the action (6) with respect to the auxiliary fields !, we obtain the
equations of motion, which for the k-th particle read:
d
d
 p
CT 1mk dqkd

=
p
TC 1rkC: (8)
As expected, (8) are given in terms of a freely specifiable monotonically increas-
ing parameter , which is consistent with the claim put forward earlier that the
dynamics of this theory dispenses with a distinguished temporal metric.
The Newtonian theory “emerges” from (8) once we fix a specific parameter t, such
that:
dt
d
=
p
TC 1: (9)
If we substitute condition (9) in (7), we get E = Tclass + V . This means that E can
be interpreted as the (fixed) energy of the system of particles under the parameter
fixing (9). Furthermore, under condition (9), (8) reduces to:
mk
d2qk
dt2
=  rkV; (10)
which is nothing but Newton’s equations of motion for the k-th particle.
The overall picture of the best-matching theory proposed here is now clear. To
recap: the theory is formulated over a Riemannian space Q0, with a Riemannian
structure consisting of a flat “kinetic” metric T curved by a conformal factor C.
Extremizing the action (6) singles out the geodesics of this space, which can be
arbitrarily parametrized by monotonically increasing real parameters. Note that,
up to this point, all the quantities at play are mere geometrical objects. Things
become interesting once the distinguished parameter t is selected by (9): in this
case we recover (i) a relation that can be interpreted as the energy conservation
theorem for a (universal)24 system of N particles, and (ii) the usual equations of
motion for this system. In short, we have shown that a Newtonian theory of N par-
ticles is “emergent” in a clear formal sense from a fundamental theory that does
not discriminate among either dierent spatial embeddings of a configuration or
the particular parametrization under which the dynamics unfolds. The clear for-
mal sense mentioned above is, in fact, one closely related to gauge fixing: we start
with a purely relational series of shapes in Q0 constituting a geodesic for (6), and
then we fix a parameter t (that is, we define Newtonian time) thanks to which we
24It is quite obvious why we need a universal perspective: if we had many subsystems of par-
ticles, and we applied a distinct condition (9) to each of them, then we would have no guarantee
that the dierent t’s would “march in step”.
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“lift” such a curve to the class of curves that satisfy (10). In short, the presented
framework represents a procedure to mathematically reduce the Newtonian theory
(10) to the embedding-and-parametrization independent theory (8).
Here, of course, we have glossed over many important technical and conceptual
aspects of the framework. For example, the original aim of Barbour and his collab-
orators is to show that a theoretical framework can be developed that implements
Machian ideas, such as the relational nature of inertial eects, or the fact that the
dynamics has to be given only in terms of observable quantities such as (ratios
of) relative distances and angles between physical bodies.25 However, what is
important for our purposes here is the fact that a fairly well-defined theoretical
framework exists that strips the Newtonian dynamics of a universal configuration
of particles of its absolute spatiotemporal structures and provides a clear mech-
anism for the emergence of such background from a fundamentally background
independent theory. Gryb (2010) in fact proposes to evaluate the background
dependence of a theory exactly under the light of this framework: a theory is
background dependent just in case it accords physical significance to the “mo-
tion” along the fibers defined by the group of spatiotemporal symmetries of the
theory (S im(3), in the present case). In this sense, the procedure to eliminate such
physical significance and turn it into simple gauge freedom by implementing a
variational principle based on (6) surely represents a more cogent way to render
a theory background independent than the usual way of making absolute objects
dynamical.
Having assessed the above framework as useful and viable, it is now time to dis-
cuss whether we can apply it in the context of BM: if it turns out that this is the
case, then we have found a very encouraging answer to our initial question regard-
ing the compatibility between Bohmian dynamics and background independence.
A possible setting of the problem might be: can we quantize the theory (8) and
then provide a guiding equation depending on the background independent wave
function such that it singles out a set of geodesics on the base configuration space
Q0? This is indeed a reasonable strategy but it should face two big challenges.
First of all, the quantization of reparametrization invariant systems is still not com-
pletely understood. For some authors, a consistent quantization of this kind of sys-
tems26 should inevitably lead to a timeless Wheeler-DeWitt equation (with all the
related well-known conceptual issues); however, people like Gryb and Thébault
(2012, 2015) challenge this conviction based on a rather technical analysis of the
phase space quantization of these systems. Secondly, even if under a Bohmian
perspective the fact that the wave function obeys a Wheeler-DeWitt-like equa-
25For an accessible but still quite technical introduction to Barbour’s framework, see Barbour
(2012).
26Namely, reparametrization invariant systems, irrespective of the fact that they are particle or
field systems.
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tion is not too big a problem and, perhaps, it is even a welcome result,27 it is
far from clear how to implement a guiding equation on Q0 such that, taking the
background independent wave function as input, it generates a vector field whose
integral curves are geodesics according to the best-matching principle. Although
these conceptual diculties are not a priori insurmountable, they show that this
route is still so much little followed that it gives us not enough results on which
we could base even a preliminary partial evaluation. Therefore, we now turn to
another possible strategy that, albeit not yet implemented (to our knowledge), is
more delineated to let us deliver a useful conceptual analysis. The basic idea un-
derlying this second strategy is brutally simple: if it is too dicult to quantize a
background independent theory, try to strip the background from an already quan-
tized one.
Let us start by summarizing the best-matching procedure discussed above. First
we started with a background dependent particle theory and we individuated the
(continuous) symmetries of the underlying background structures. Secondly we
modified the picture of the configuration space of the theory as a principal fiber
bundle structure whose fibers are the “gauge orbits” generated by the symmetry
group and the base space is the real fundamental configuration space. Thirdly,
we defined (i) a notion of coordinates shifting according to the action of the ele-
ments of the symmetry group, (ii) a connection over the fiber bundle that specifies
a covariant derivative, and (iii) a flat “kinetic” metric given in terms of shifted
coordinates and covariant derivatives, which is curved by a conformal factor de-
pending on potential V of the system. Finally, we used this machinery to set a
variational problem of the Jacobi-type in order to get the equations of motion.
Given that BM is formulated over R3N , the first two steps are implementable as in
the previous case. The real problem is setting a variational problem (6) for this
theory, especially with respect to finding an appropriate conformal factor C that
accounts for the inter-particle “influences”. This is obvious because BM is not a
classical theory in that the behavior of the particles in a configuration is not only
dictated by the physical interactions encoded in a classical potential V , but also
- and more importantly - by the structure of the wave function. It is in fact 	
that confers the non-local behavior on a configuration of particles, with the result
that a Bohmian configuration is much more “rigid” than a classical one. Does
this fact spoil the above considered framework? Perhaps not, provided we “cheat”
a little bit. The cheating we are referring to consists in camouflaging BM as a
“pseudo-Newtonian” theory. This can be easily done by writing the wave func-
tion in polar form (i.e. by putting 	(Q; t) = R(Q; t)eiS (Q;t), R and S being real
27In a Bohmian framework, thanks to the guiding equation, even a timeless Wheeler-DeWitt-
like equation generates a non-trivial dynamics. Furthermore, since the wave function has a law-like
status, the fact that it does not change in time but it is somehow selected once and for all ab initio
by the Wheeler-DeWitt equation is perhaps more conceptually comfortable.
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functions), and then inserting it into (1a). The resulting formula will consist of
two coupled equations, one expressing the conservation of j	j2 along particles’
trajectories, the other being:
@S
@t
+
NX
i=1
(riS )2
2mi
+ V +V = 0: (11)
Since our starting theory is (1), that is a non-relativistic theory of N point-like
particles, what we have done is basically to rewrite it as a (quantum) Hamilton-
Jacobi theory, where the k-th particle’s velocity is rkSmk (which is nothing but (2)
written in polar form), and the total potential has now another “quantum” term
besides the classical one V , namely:
V =  
NX
i=1
1
2mi
r2i R
R
: (12)
The reason why we call it a potential becomes manifest if we derive (11) with
respect of rk, thus arriving at a “Newtonian-like” equation of motion for the k-th
particle, which reads:
mk
d2qk
dt2
=  rk V +V:28 (13)
Clearly, (13) resembles (10) with the additional term (12) being a “quantum” po-
tential. It is very important to stress the fact that such a rewriting of the theory is
just a convenient disguise totally deprived of any substantial physical meaning.29
The theory (1) is, in fact, a first order theory where accelerations - let alone “quan-
tum” forces - play no fundamental role at all. Furthermore, as already stressed in
section 2, one key feature of (1) is that it delivers us from the need of postulating
the existence of 	 as a physical field that exerts a “quantum” force to the parti-
cles. Hence, the purpose of calling the attention on (11) and (13) resides only in
the fact that (1) is not structurally incompatible with the best-matching framework
sketched above. This claim becomes straightforward once we realize that, by in-
terpreting (11) as a quantum Hamilton-Jacobi equation, the quantum behavior of
the particles can be accounted for by a modified best-matching principle involving
an action of the form (6), which features a conformal factor C = E  W - where
28It is possible to arrive at the same expression by dierentiating (1b) with respect to time,
which stresses the fact that we are just fiddling with the formalism of our starting theory (1).
29At least, in the present approach. In Bohm’s own formulation the quantum potential was
regarded as primary, and there exists also a “quantum force” formulation of the de Broglie-Bohm
theory where (13) is in fact the fundamental equation (see Bowman, 2011 for an introduction to
this latter approach, and see also Goldstein et al., 2011, sections 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6, for a discussion
of the utility of (13) in BM).
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E is the “total energy” of the particle system,30 andW = (V +V) is the total po-
tential -, and a “kinetic” metric T depending on
P
i(riS )2. If such a theory could
be consistently worked out, then the quantum information encoded in the wave
function would be reduced to geometrical features of the Riemannian structure
defined over shape space.
However, showing that BM can be put in a form that looks classical is not enough
to prove that it can be stripped of its Newtonian background using Barbour’s strat-
egy. This is because, in this case, both the kinetic term and the additional quantum
potential are not interpretable using classical notions: they are rather an elaborated
way to disguise the wave function. Indeed, in general, the kinetic term has a non-
trivial dependence on the wave function’s phase S , while the potential (12) is not a
preassigned function depending on particles’ positions only, but has a complicated
structure involving a spatial gradient of the wave function’s amplitude. Therefore,
setting up a best-matching principle of the form (6) involving a kinetic term and a
total potential as they appear in (11) requires a certain amount of technical work,
including (i) specifying the additional symmetries that these quantities have, (ii)
figuring out how to properly parametrize them (since both S and R are in general
time-dependent functions), (iii) spelling out a rigorous mathematical procedure to
perform a variation on them, and (iv) considering how putting these terms in (6)
changes the mathematical picture.
To summarize: given that from a best-matched theory (8) it is possible to recover a
theory whose equations of motion have the form (10), and given that the equations
of motion of BM can be massaged into such a form, we conclude that there is no
a priori or self-evident argument that speaks against the possibility of considering
BM as being reducible to a more fundamental best-matched theory. Therefore,
since best-matching can be seen as an eective strategy to strip a theory of its
background spatiotemporal structures in a non-trivial sense, we have shown that
there are good reasons to think that BM can be made background independent.
5 Conclusion
The heuristic argument put forward at the end of the previous section on why the
best-matching strategy should probably work in BM rests on a rather simple obser-
vation: the dynamics of Bohmian particle systems is perfectly embedded in New-
tonian spacetime as the standard classical dynamics is. This means that both in a
Bohmian and in a Newtonian setting we have swarms of particles moving in Eu-
clidean 3-space under the ticking of a universal immutable clock. What changes in
the two pictures is the behavior of the particles - and, indeed, such a dierence is
30That is, under the parameter fixing (9), we expect to find E =   @S
@t .
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extremely radical, being at the root of the classical/quantum divide. Nonetheless,
with respect to considerations regarding the symmetries of spacetime, it seems that
we can safely assume that a Bohmian system has a well-defined kinetic energy (al-
though this is not a fundamental quantity, but supervenes on the wave function’s
phase), and is subjected to “yet another potential” (although a rather strange and
complicated one). In turn, this hints at the fact that we can absorb these quantities
in the key ingredient of a best-matched theory, namely the conformally deformed
metric CT on shape space, which accounts for the theory’s dynamics through the
implementation of the best-matching action principle. Why is the fact that BM is
embedded in Newtonian spacetime so important? Because, as long as the main
result of the best-matching procedure is eliminating the background spatiotempo-
ral structures from the picture, the fact that BM and Newtonian mechanics share
the same spatiotemporal arena assures us that best-matching does not care much
about how much "strange" particles’ movements in such an arena are, but just
cares about the arena itself. Moreover, the “rigidity” of Bohmian configurations,
due to the fact that the quantum potential is independent on the inter-particle sep-
arations - so that the behavior of each particle strongly depends on the behavior
of all the others -, naturally fits into the “holistic” perspective of best-matching,
since this framework needs to focus on universal configurations in order to recover
a useful notion of “universal clock”. From this point of view, BM is even more
akin to best-matching than classical mechanics, where the fact that the standard
potentials (e.g. the gravitational one) fall o with the inverse of the inter-particle
separation renders each particle’s behavior actually dependent just on the behavior
of its neighbors, thus making the talk of configurations as a whole less necessary.
To conclude, even if we have not provided a final answer to the question that en-
titles this paper, we have nonetheless reached two important intermediate results,
namely, (i) we have pointed out a promising strategy to render BM background
independent (best-matching), and (ii) we have shown that BM is not structurally
incompatible with such a strategy. The next step will be to show beyond heuris-
tics that BM can be made background independent by implementing the best-
matching procedure as suggested in the previous section. With no doubt, this will
be quite a formidable task for mathematicians and physicists but, as this paper
shows, the route is open and ready to be walked.
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